By Eko B. Supriyanto, Editor-in-Chief of Infobank Media Group
IN THE BEGINNING, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) was established with a clear and explicit purpose: to serve as an independent guardian of the financial services sector, free from interference by any party. The OJK exists to ensure that activities in the financial sector are conducted in an orderly, fair, transparent, and accountable manner, while simultaneously protecting the interests of consumers and the public.
Article 4 of Law No. 21 of 2011 on the OJK affirms that this institution is independent in carrying out its functions, duties, and authorities. This is further reinforced by the Law on the Development and Strengthening of the Financial Sector (P2SK Law), which reaffirms and strengthens the OJK’s status as an independent state institution.
However, practices on the ground do not always align with the letter of the law. These days, the financial community is witnessing how the OJK is increasingly being “dragged” into the vortex of dominant politics. As reported by the media, the first agenda item for the OJK’s new team following the inauguration was a meeting to discuss how to optimize the financial sector’s contribution to the government’s priority programs.
It is no longer just talk. The OJK is even drafting regulations to adjust Bank Business Plans (RBB) so that banks can more actively support government programs. As of January 2026, total financing from the financial services sector for the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program, the Red and White Village Cooperatives (KDMP), and the 3 million homes program has reached Rp177.38 trillion.
The intriguing question then arises: does the OJK still function as an independent regulator, or is it beginning to transform into a sort of “task force” implementing the political agenda of the ruling government?
That the OJK needs to support national development programs is not wrong at all. In many countries, financial regulators are indeed mandated to help drive economic growth. The issue lies in the boundaries of that support: where does it stop, and where does the supervisory function take over?
The MBG program, for example, is a noble initiative. Providing free nutritious meals to schoolchildren is part of the effort to enlighten the nation’s life. However, when the OJK and Bank Indonesia (BI) jointly encourage banks to finance this program—even with liquidity incentives from BI amounting to Rp427.1 trillion and prudential rule relaxations from the OJK—a valid question arises: who will oversee the quality of these loans?
Economists warn that the risk of non-performing loans in financing such programs remains high because business operators’ governance capabilities are still limited. If non-performing loans occur on a massive scale, it will not only be the banks that bear the burden, but also depositors—ordinary people who have placed their money in banks in the hope that it is safe. This is where the OJK’s supervisory role should act as a shield, not as a facilitator.
Even more concerning is the increasingly overt trend of political intervention. The ongoing revision of the P2SK Law in the House of Representatives is viewed by many as a gateway for political interference in financial sector authorities, including the OJK, the Central Bank (BI), and the Deposit Insurance Agency (LPS).
Of the 16 key amendments in the P2SK Bill, there are provisions deemed risky for creating room for political intervention in independent financial institutions. Economists warn that this move could threaten financial stability and lead to dangerous politicization.
It is true that the DPR subsequently clarified its position, stating it would not directly interfere with the OJK’s independence but would only perform performance oversight functions. However, as the old saying goes, “the devil” is always in the details. Who can guarantee that the DPR’s “oversight function” will not turn into a tool for political pressure?
Honestly, restoring the OJK’s function and role as a financial services regulator is no easy task amid the prevailing political climate. It requires the courage to say “no” when necessary—a courage that is increasingly rare in this country. The OJK must return to its original mandate. It must remain an independent institution whose oversight is not blunted by political pressure. Furthermore, its protection of consumers must not be eroded by the interests of a select few. Who dares to defy political will these days? If one dares to “defy,” they may well face legal action, as has happened in many recent cases. Such cases are easy to find.
Government programs such as MBG and KDMP may well be important and noble. But implementing these programs is the task of the relevant ministries, not the OJK’s. The OJK’s task is to oversee that the financing for these programs does not become a time bomb that could explode in the people’s lap.
After all, ultimately, the OJK’s independence is not merely about the institution itself. It is a matter of trust: public trust, investor trust, and market trust. If that trust collapses, it is not just the OJK that will crumble but the entire financial sector—the very foundation supporting the nation’s economy.
Let us hope that does not happen. The financial services industry, which pays its dues, hopes the OJK remains independent and does not become a government task force.
Restoring the Functions and Role of the OJK, Between “Dominant” Politics and Oversight
By Eko B. Supriyanto, Editor-in-Chief of Infobank Media Group
IN THE BEGINNING, the Financial Services Authority (OJK) was established with a clear and explicit purpose: to serve as an independent guardian of the financial services sector, free from interference by any party. The OJK exists to ensure that activities in the financial sector are conducted in an orderly, fair, transparent, and accountable manner, while simultaneously protecting the interests of consumers and the public.
Article 4 of Law No. 21 of 2011 on the OJK affirms that this institution is independent in carrying out its functions, duties, and authorities. This is further reinforced by the Law on the Development and Strengthening of the Financial Sector (P2SK Law), which reaffirms and strengthens the OJK’s status as an independent state institution.
However, practices on the ground do not always align with the letter of the law. These days, the financial community is witnessing how the OJK is increasingly being “dragged” into the vortex of dominant politics. As reported by the media, the first agenda item for the OJK’s new team following the inauguration was a meeting to discuss how to optimize the financial sector’s contribution to the government’s priority programs.
It is no longer just talk. The OJK is even drafting regulations to adjust Bank Business Plans (RBB) so that banks can more actively support government programs. As of January 2026, total financing from the financial services sector for the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program, the Red and White Village Cooperatives (KDMP), and the 3 million homes program has reached Rp177.38 trillion.
The intriguing question then arises: does the OJK still function as an independent regulator, or is it beginning to transform into a sort of “task force” implementing the political agenda of the ruling government?
That the OJK needs to support national development programs is not wrong at all. In many countries, financial regulators are indeed mandated to help drive economic growth. The issue lies in the boundaries of that support: where does it stop, and where does the supervisory function take over?
The MBG program, for example, is a noble initiative. Providing free nutritious meals to schoolchildren is part of the effort to enlighten the nation’s life. However, when the OJK and Bank Indonesia (BI) jointly encourage banks to finance this program—even with liquidity incentives from BI amounting to Rp427.1 trillion and prudential rule relaxations from the OJK—a valid question arises: who will oversee the quality of these loans?
Economists warn that the risk of non-performing loans in financing such programs remains high because business operators’ governance capabilities are still limited. If non-performing loans occur on a massive scale, it will not only be the banks that bear the burden, but also depositors—ordinary people who have placed their money in banks in the hope that it is safe. This is where the OJK’s supervisory role should act as a shield, not as a facilitator.
Even more concerning is the increasingly overt trend of political intervention. The ongoing revision of the P2SK Law in the House of Representatives is viewed by many as a gateway for political interference in financial sector authorities, including the OJK, the Central Bank (BI), and the Deposit Insurance Agency (LPS).
Of the 16 key amendments in the P2SK Bill, there are provisions deemed risky for creating room for political intervention in independent financial institutions. Economists warn that this move could threaten financial stability and lead to dangerous politicization.
It is true that the DPR subsequently clarified its position, stating it would not directly interfere with the OJK’s independence but would only perform performance oversight functions. However, as the old saying goes, “the devil” is always in the details. Who can guarantee that the DPR’s “oversight function” will not turn into a tool for political pressure?
Honestly, restoring the OJK’s function and role as a financial services regulator is no easy task amid the prevailing political climate. It requires the courage to say “no” when necessary—a courage that is increasingly rare in this country. The OJK must return to its original mandate. It must remain an independent institution whose oversight is not blunted by political pressure. Furthermore, its protection of consumers must not be eroded by the interests of a select few. Who dares to defy political will these days? If one dares to “defy,” they may well face legal action, as has happened in many recent cases. Such cases are easy to find.
Government programs such as MBG and KDMP may well be important and noble. But implementing these programs is the task of the relevant ministries, not the OJK’s. The OJK’s task is to oversee that the financing for these programs does not become a time bomb that could explode in the people’s lap.
After all, ultimately, the OJK’s independence is not merely about the institution itself. It is a matter of trust: public trust, investor trust, and market trust. If that trust collapses, it is not just the OJK that will crumble but the entire financial sector—the very foundation supporting the nation’s economy.
Let us hope that does not happen. The financial services industry, which pays its dues, hopes the OJK remains independent and does not become a government task force.
