Demutualization of the IDX, a “Bloodless” Coup Three OJK Commissioner Resign Honourably

By: Eko B. Supriyanto, Editor-in-Chief of Infobank

Three commissioners of the Financial Services Authority (OJK) have resigned. This honorable step was taken by Mahendra Siregar (Chair), Mirza Adityaswara (Deputy Chair), and Inarno Djajadi (Commissioner). This follows the dignified and honorable resignation of Iman Rachman, President Director of the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The reason given to the public was moral responsibility, as stock prices plummeted 8 percent within a few hours of trading on Monday (1/26/2026). However, the resignations still raise questions in the market.

The stock price slump followed a review by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). Meanwhile, some parties called it a “bloodless coup” that took advantage of the decline in stock prices. Stock price fluctuations are common and have occurred several years ago.

After the stock price slumped, trading was suspended and three OJK commissioners resigned. In line with this, the discourse on the demutualization of the IDX was touted as a panacea. It must be acknowledged that the 2023 P2SK Law already includes provisions on the demutualization of the IDX. All that remains is the Government Regulation (PP), which is said to be issued in the first semester of 2026. In fact, President Prabowo has requested that the demutualization be completed quickly.

It is said that the transformation from a securities company “club” into a modern corporation will cure old problems: rigid governance and lack of transparency. Then, with ease, the Investment Management Agency (BPI) Daya Anagata Nusantara (Danantara) — the state fund manager — raised its hand, preparing to enter as a prospective shareholder. On the other hand, Danantara is a shareholder in state-owned enterprises, many of which are listed on the stock exchange.

The question we must ask policymakers is not “will this be resolved by next semester?”, but something more fundamental and dangerous: Are we repairing the capital market, or destroying its foundations of trust?

According to a closed discussion at the Infobank Institute, there are at least two important issues to consider when Danantara becomes the controlling shareholder of the IDX.

First, governance will erode. Could it shift from a fragmented oligarchy to a state monopoly? Currently, the IDX is owned by brokers and securities companies. This mutual structure is like a “fragmented oligarchy.” Power is spread among many members with conflicting interests. This has indeed given rise to slow bureaucracy and the potential for “family” collusion. Its governance is inefficient, often trapped in internal political compromises between securities.

However, within this imperfection, there is one principle that is naturally maintained. Namely, no single dominant player can direct the exchange solely for the benefit of its own portfolio. The IDX, although clumsily managed, remains a relatively neutral temple. The conflicts of interest that exist are horizontal and mutually monitored. Thus, management is more transparent.

Now, compare this with the scenario of Danantara entering the market. This means that it has the potential to replace the “fragmented oligarchy” with a monopoly of strategic national interests. Danantara is not a passive investor. It is a giant that is scooping up strategic assets across all economic sectors. Giving it control over the exchange is like giving the keys to the “arsenal” to one of the strongest soldiers on the battlefield. Terrifying.

What kind of governance can be expected when the “referee” (IDX) is structurally owned and possibly controlled by a “star player” (Danantara) who has a direct interest in stock price movements, listing rules, and depth of information? This is no longer a matter of problematic governance, but rather governance that is flawed from the outset. The conflict of interest will be vertical, systemic, and unsolvable.

Second, transparency, from “fog” to “darkness”? The mutual structure has been criticized for its limited transparency. Member meetings, although closed to the public, still involve many parties who are watching each other. Information leaks have many eyes watching.

Transparency under the Danantara banner faces an even more paradoxical threat. How can an entity whose own portfolio management is often questioned for its transparency (as a sovereign wealth fund) guarantee the transparency of the exchange it owns?

It must be acknowledged that Danantara will wear two hats. One, as an investment manager seeking to maximize profits (often requiring tactical agility and secrecy), and as an exchange owner that must uphold absolute transparency. This is an irreconcilable contradiction. Second, compliance with disclosure principles for companies in Danantara’s portfolio will always be faced with the temptation to be manipulated, slowed down, or regulated in such a way. Transparency will become a “slave” to the strategic interests of the portfolio.

As a result, the public will find it difficult to distinguish whether an IDX policy was created for the benefit of the market or to fertilize Danantara’s own investment garden. The current “fog” has the potential to turn into structured darkness.

Demutualization, ideally, is intended to separate exchange ownership from market participants in order to eliminate conflicts of interest. However, this noble intention has been hijacked by short-sighted power politics. Instead of selling IDX shares to a broad and passive public, or to neutral pension institutions, we have instead opened the door wide to the most rapacious forces of state capital.

This is a dangerous step backward. We risk replacing the disease of slow governance with the cancer of conflict of interest. We potentially exchange a stuffy “club” atmosphere for a “cage” where the strongest lion controls the entire food chain.

The capital market stands on the pillars of trust. That trust stems from the neutrality of the exchange and uncompromised transparency. Including Danantara in the ownership of the IDX, in any significant scheme, is not a cure, but a poison that will paralyze both pillars.

The right choice is not between the old problematic structure and a new structure that is “flawed” from birth. The right choice is sterile demutualization, which completely severs the chain of ownership from all active players—both private and state. The exchange must be truly public property, managed for the market, not for anyone’s portfolio, including the state’s portfolio.

Otherwise, demutualization will only be an expensive power transaction: selling the integrity of Indonesia’s capital market for the illusion of efficiency and fresh capital. And history will record it as the day when trust, the priceless asset of the market, was sacrificed on the altar of ambition.

Clearly, the decline in stock prices due to MSCI’s “hand” is merely the initial cause. And the real cause is that the OJK commissioners were ousted without bloodshed—resigning with dignity and standing tall with the capital market’s achievements, which continue to climb with more than 20 million investors. (*)